报告题目：Screening Under Fixed Cost of Misrepresentation

报告人：谭彦之

报告时间：2021年11月12日（星期五）上午10:00-11:00

报告地点：商学院大楼210会议室

报告人简介：

谭彦之 博士，华东理工大学奥利弗·哈特合同与治理研究中心博士后，2020年获不列颠哥伦比亚大学经济学博士学位，主要研究应用微观经济理论、机制设计、行为经济学。

报告摘要: 

This paper studies optimal screening problem in which an agent incurs a fixed cost of lying when she misrepresents her private information. In this environment, local incentive constraints are not binding in the optimal mechanism, and standard techniques for solving screening problems are not applicable. Significantly, the problem can no longer be dichotomized into two parts solved sequentially: an implementability part which involves an envelope condition and the monotonicity of the allocation, and an optimization part. We develop a new methodology to tackle this problem, characterize the optimal mechanism and compute it in special cases. Our method involves a procedure that jointly solves for the binding non-local incentive constraints and the optimal allocation. The optimal mechanism has a number of novel qualitative properties, such as lack of exclusion and first-best efficient allocation at high- and low- ends of the spectrum of types. Also, bunching never occurs, as the optimal quantity allocation is always increasing in type irrespectively of type distribution.