Seminar in Contracts and Governance (No.1)

Spearker: Meichen Chen 

Topic:  Signaling in Initial Coin Offerings

Abstract: Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is an emerging form of crowd-financing in which entrepreneurs sell tokens to finance the project before launching. We construct a theoretical model to investigate the optimal ICO structure from the perspective of signaling. In particular, we focus on how a more informed entrepreneur could signal the project’s potential return to the less informed investors through setting appropriate soft cap-—the minimum amount of collected investment to launch the project, and hard cap—the maximum amount that can be raised. It is shown that soft cap always works as an efficient signaling device while hard cap is efficient only if the project’s value is high enough.

Location:  viz Zoom; Room 318

Meeting Time: Sep. 22th, 2020, 8:30-9:30am CST;  Sep. 21th, 2020, 8:30-9:30pm EST