Speaker: Meichen Chen

Topic: Commitment and Compromise in Repeated Games

Abstract: 

In this paper, we study two person infinitely repeated games in which players choose finite state automata instead of actions at each stage and at the end of each period there is a chance for each player to be committed to the prevailing automaton. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium in this repeated automaton game with commitment. The main result shows that the well-known folk theorem does not hold and we characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs under our constructions. In particular, we show that in a special class of symmetric games, provided that a small enough probability of commitment is fixed, the equilibrium payoff vector will be located in a small neighborhood of the symmetric Pareto efficient payoff vector as the players become sufficiently patient.

Location:  via Zoom; Room 210

Meeting Time: Nov. 25th, 2021, 10:00-11:00am CST; Nov. 24th, 2021, 9:00-10:00pm EST